Yet Another September: AOL, World of Warcraft, and Niche Markets by op'tLand, Ray
CULTURE ·  POLITICS ·  TECHNOLOGY
A Graduate Journal of Communication • Spring 2009 • 2(1) • ISSN 1916–5897 • www.streamjournal.org
Stream: Culture/Politics/Technology is a peer-reviewed, open-access e-journal published by the  
Communcation Graduate Student Caucus at Simon Fraser University.
Managing Editor: Danielle Deveau 
Editorial Board: Rebecca Scott, Kate Milberry, Kaia Scott, Arsalan Butt 
Copy Editor: Dylan Mulvin 
Design and Layout: Laurynas Navidauskas 
This journal provides a unique, national forum for emerging Canadian researchers. Encompassing  
communication studies approaches to the often overlapping “streams” of culture, politics and technology, 
Stream challenges conceptions of these subjects with innovative, interdisciplinary scholarship.  
Visit www.streamjournal.org for more information.
The editors would like to thank and acknowledge the work of all those who volunteered as peer-reviewers.
Submit to Stream
Stream is interested in publishing articles and book 
reviews by Canadian graduate students in commu-
nication studies and related fields. Papers should 
fit into one of the three proposed “streams,” but we 
invite contributors to challenge their conceptions of 
these subjects with interdisciplinary approaches to 
these subject areas. We hope that this student initia-
tive will become a space for graduate students to 
publish new work and expand upon new ideas, con-
tributing to a thriving graduate intellectual culture. 
Visit www.streamjournal.org for full author 
guidelines and register to submit a paper. 
Become a Peer-reviewer
Register at www.streamjournal.org and enter your-
self into our database of graduate student reviewers.
Stream and Creative Commons 
Stream supports and strives to integrate the ideals 
of the creative commons and copyleft movements at 
every possible level. To that end, journal articles are 
immediately freely available to the public, released 
under a Creative Commons Attribution–Noncom-
mercial–No derivative works licence. 
Furthermore, they may be reproduced and dis-
tributed freely for noncommercial uses if the author 
is identified and nothing is changed. 
Consider including Stream articles in your 
students’ courseware packages.
© 2009   
Some rights reserved. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons  
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.5 Canada Licence.  
Visit creativecommons.org or streamjournal.org for more information.
Stream: Culture • Politics • Technology 2 (1) • 10
Yet Another September:  
AOL, World of Warcraft, and Niche Markets
Ray op’tLand
Since its introduction in November 2004, World of Warcraft (WoW) has 
exploded in popularity within the sphere of Massively-Multiplayer Online 
Role-Playing Games (MMOs), dominating the field with over 11.5 mil-
lion monthly subscribers (Woodcock, 2008). It has become a pop-culture 
phenomenon, parodied in South Park, promoted by William Shatner, and 
fiercely defended by its proponents. However, much of the current analysis of 
the game itself has been on the activities and functions that occur within its 
virtual space (Ducheneaut, et. al., 2006). The exogenous processes by which 
WoW came to dominate in its sphere have been under-explored, and the ef-
fect their marketplace entry had on established groups within that sphere has 
been neglected. In this paper, I propose that similarities to what WoW has 
accomplished in the MMO market can be found in the rise of America Online 
(AOL) in the early 1990s, and its effect on the existing service providers and 
systems of the nascent Internet. Exemplifying this is the opening of UseNet 
to its users in 1993, the infamous “September That Never Ended.”
While on the surface there may be few commonalities between the two 
other than their use of Internet protocols, both AOL and WoW are compa-
rable in a number of essential empirical characteristics that they share. Chief 
of these is their relative size compared to the market that they now dominate. 
Both AOL at its peak, and WoW currently, were an order of magnitude larger 
than their nearest competitors. Concomitant to this is the speed with which 
this dominance was achieved, in both cases coming in under 5 years from the 
point of entry into the new market. The third point of comparison would be 
the business model that they undertook: provide a service in return for a low, 
recurring monthly fee, in the neighborhood of $20 per month. (AOL initially 
had a per minute charge, but changed to a flat monthly fee in 1996 in order 
to stave off competitors in its market). At this price point, the product is able 
to position itself as a high-return commodity, with “unlimited” usage during 
the course of the month. This compares favorably with other leisure activi-
ties such as moviegoing, where the same $15 only covers the ticket price for 
one person for the 2-hour duration. While this monthly fee is the common 
practice in the MMO market, it does distinguish AOL from other potential 
sources of comparison, products that are contemporaneous to WoW yet offer 
their service in “free,” user-data-driven models such as Google and Face-
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book. Finally, by examining the historical accounts of the rise of both AOL 
and WoW, we can see how they were able to accomplish this not through any 
superior technology or financial model, but by innovating in the social and 
cultural conditions that existed in their respective markets.
AOL and World of Warcraft: A comparative early history
While in recent years AOL has become emblematic of the millennial dot-
com busts, after its spectacular acquisition of Time-Warner Inc. in 2001 and 
subsequent tumble in the stock market (Swisher, 2003; Chapman, 2006), the 
early history of the corporation provides a vastly different picture than the 
one popularized in the Internet era. Beginning as CVC, Control Video Cor-
poration, in 1982, they sought to provide downloadable content for the Atari 
2600 VCS (Swisher, 1998; Stauffer, 2000). This idea came to an end as the 
home video-game market collapsed in 1983 and 1984, exemplified by the 
infamous release of the E.T. video game in 1983 (Wolf, 2008). Reforming 
as Quantum Link Corporation in 1985, they began providing online services 
to Commodore 64 users through a “portal,” a simplified entry screen for the 
user to select from various categories (Swisher, 1998). From 1987 to 1989, 
they transitioned away from the failing Commodore platform and became the 
sole Internet service provider available for the Macintosh brand of comput-
ers made by Apple. It was here that they re-branded their product America 
Online. After a falling-out, they shifted platforms once again, and Quantum 
Link began providing AOL services for Microsoft’s DOS-based computers 
(Swisher, 1998; Stauffer, 2000).
It was into this sphere that AOL arrived, one already dominated with 
established firms such as CompuServe and Prodigy (Abbate, 1999), as well 
as private service providers within corporations and university campuses. 
However, like many invasive species finding themselves in a new ecosystem, 
they soon found a niche within which they could thrive. After re-branding the 
company with the name of their leading product, AOL began an aggressive 
marketing campaign consisting of the mass-mailout of floppy disks contain-
ing the software that would connect users to AOL’s services (Stauffer, 2000). 
The near-ubiquitous presence of these disks was ultimately not a technical 
innovation, as technologically they were well behind their more established 
competitors, but rather a social innovation, that allowed them to fully exploit 
the “fitness landscape” (Nelson & Winter, 1982) they found themselves in. 
Following the launch of the floppy-disk campaign, they began to ag-
gressively overtake their competitors. At that time, CompuServe was the lead 
player in the domestic US market with 1.5 million users, Prodigy was second 
with over 450,000 users, and AOL was a distant third with below 200,000. 
The floppy campaign began an era of double- and triple-digit year-over-year 
Stream 2 (1) • op’tLand: Yet another September • 12
growth. During the eight-year period from 1993 to 2000, their yearly growth 
ranged from a low of 36% to a high of 197% (Stauffer, 2000). Just four 
years after the start of the campaign, AOL was able to purchase CompuServe 
outright, which it maintained as an independent brand due to its popularity in 
the European market. AOL’s growth continued unabated until the aforemen-
tioned acquisition of Time-Warner Inc. in 2001 (Swisher, 2003).
By comparison, World of Warcraft also entered an established market 
that was dominated by a number of established firms. The software company 
behind WoW, Blizzard Entertainment, was originally treated with varying 
degrees of skepticism and celebration upon the announcement in 2001 of its 
intention to enter the then-heavily contested MMO market. Due to the lead 
times in bringing a product to market within that sphere, they were not ready 
to launch to the public until November 2004 (a date timed strategically to 
take advantage of Black Friday, the post-Thanksgiving shopping rush in the 
United States). At the time of their launch, the largest player in the market 
was Everquest (EQ), the 5-year reigning champion of the industry, produced 
by Sony Online Entertainment (SOE). EQ’s subscriber base at that time was 
just below 500,000 users a month (Woodcock, 2008), all paying the same 
$14.95 USD monthly charge to play the game. SOE had also just rushed a 
sequel of the game to market, Everquest 2, two weeks prior to the launch of 
WoW. EQ2 had garnered some degree of critical accolades for novel addi-
tions to the genre, but had nowhere near the user base of the original game, 
due to its steep system requirements, and an audience split between two ver-
sions of the same game. 
Within 3 months, World of Warcraft had equaled the user-base of Ever-
quest, and its growth continued unabated, setting new peak sales numbers 
every month (Ducheneaut, et. al., 2006; Woodcock, 2008). Oddly enough, 
this was not due to a cannibalization of the existing users of the other games, 
as EQ’s user numbers did not begin to appreciably decline until the follow-
ing year. Rather it represented Blizzard and WoW bringing in substantial 
amounts of new users to the MMO market that would not otherwise have 
participated within it. Much like AOL’s floppies, this too was a social innova-
tion. By leveraging their customers from their existing games, where Bliz-
zard had a longstanding reputation for a quality product, and by providing 
easy means of access to potential new customers, WoW was able to achieve 
and sustain incredibly rapid growth. Chief amongst these was the download-
able free-trial, which enabled full access to the game for a limited period of 
time (10 or 14 days), and the inclusion of “buddy keys” within purchased 
copies of the game itself, encouraging users to share their copy with friends, 
allowing them to play together for a 30-day period before having to purchase 
their own copy. Also to be noted was their near-exclusive claim to the MMO 
market amongst Macintosh users, whose large market share of artists and 
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college students (Kahney, 2002) allowed them to leverage the entirety of that 
lucrative market.
Entering the niche
Mapping a conceptual model to the empirical data has proven to be some-
what problematic. However, there is a framework of systemic corporatiza-
tion in the private sphere that is done from a sociological standpoint that 
may be illuminating to what AOL has accomplished. George Rizter’s work 
in The McDonaldization of Society (2000) provides a systematic breakdown 
of the processes by which this exemplary corporation of 20th century mo-
dernity achieved its success. However, the very concentration on the brick 
and mortar trappings of modernity does not allow it to address all the issues 
pertaining to Internet-enabled firms properly. Alan Bryman’s Disneyization of 
Society (2004) builds on Ritzer’s work, and brings that analysis to bear on a 
post-modern, media-centric company.
Bryman also recognizes the negative connotations that Disneyfication 
has acquired, referencing the cultural products that are produced by the Walt 
Disney Corporation, and how they appropriate and “bowdlerize” the cultural 
products of other societies. Seeking to distance himself from this pejorative 
context, he aligns himself with Ritzer’s “-ization” of the term (2004, p. 5). 
A similar need is evidenced here, as any comparison with AOL, however 
accurate, will be loaded with negative connotations. However, as Lakoff and 
Johnson note, “new metaphors… pick out a range of experience by highlight-
ing, downplaying, and hiding” (1980, p. 152). By focusing on what is meant 
to be similar within the metaphor that is chosen, those salient characteristics 
that are most applicable can be brought to the fore.
Both McDonaldization and Disneyization are systemic processes that 
are representative of their influence on the socio-cultural landscape that sur-
rounds them (Bryman, 2004, p. 161). So too is the process by which AOL 
undertook its corporate colonization of the web. And just as Bryman’s ty-
pology of the process deviates somewhat from Ritzer’s due to the different 
nature of the enterprises (Bryman, 2004, p. 2-5), so too do the processes that 
AOL undertook. They are not directly analogous. But by breaking down the 
process into its component stages we can see the extent to which World of 
Warcraft mirrored AOL’s rise.
The 4-stage processes by which both AOL and World of Warcraft came 
to dominate their respective niches occurred in the following manner: the 
simplification of technical requirements, the saturation of the market with 
the software, the engulfment of traditional groups, and the establishment of a 
new paradigm by nature of its omnipresence. Each stage in turn leveraged the 
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achievements of the previous stage to develop and sustain growth. As with 
Bryman’s process of Disneyization (2004), the stages produce a mutually-
reinforcing system. Looking at each stage in turn we can see how AOL and 
WoW fit within this model.
1) Simplification of technical requirements 
Both firms entered their target market with a user experience that was care-
fully constructed to the largest degree possible. There was a strong intention-
ality that was evinced in the design process (Feng & Feenberg, 2008). AOL 
provided a simple and accessible interface that obscured the technical details 
of the underlying process to a degree, and provided an easy-to-use graphical 
interface. As noted previously, WoW eschewed the steep technical require-
ments of its competitors such as Everquest 2, and created a highly stylized ar-
tistically rendered game-space. They also courted a broader base of users by 
allowing Macintosh and Windows users to play simultaneously. Finally, they 
also simplified the user interface, hiding the more esoteric components from 
novice users and facilitating easy play within their space as much as possible. 
Contrary to the early designers of MMOs which had an almost adversarial re-
lationship with their user base, WoW was very accommodating to the novice 
user. In both instances this simplification and obfuscation is symptomatic of 
Borgmann’s “device paradigm” of technological interaction (1984).
2) Saturation of the target market 
As noted in the historical overview, it was here that the largest innovations 
were made by both AOL and WoW. Following Nelson and Winters’s (1982) 
notion that an innovation can occur via a process of adaptation or diffusion, 
wherein a process that is new to the market or firm (but not necessarily novel 
outside that sphere) may be seen as innovative, the marketing tactics that 
were employed that leveraged pre-existing social networks can be seen as 
the greatest single factor in both firms’ respective successes. By ensuring that 
these new users found the easy-to-use environment created in the first Stage 
once they decided to join, they were able to maintain a high-level of retention 
among them.
3) Engulfment of traditional groups
This high level of retention played into the firms’ ability to achieve explo-
sive growth. By not experiencing the same level of “churn” that was typical 
in their markets, and by continuing to reinforce the number of new users 
that were entering the market by the use of the social innovation techniques 
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in marketing that they employed in the second Stage, the firms soon found 
themselves not only surpassing the traditional giants of their market, but 
dwarfing the competition in monthly subscriptions (Stauffer, 2006; Wood-
cock, 2008).
4) Establishment of new paradigm 
Finally, as AOL and World of Warcraft came to represent the vast majority 
of users in the markets that they had entered, and were often the first point 
of reference in these markets—by which their users judged all the competi-
tion—a new Kuhnian paradigm shift occurred within their respective spheres. 
From that point on, they began to dominate the discussion amongst both the 
public and academia, and were often assumed to be representative of that 
market as a whole.
A September that never ended…
All time since September 1993. One of the seasonal rhythms of the Usenet used 
to be the annual September influx of clueless newbies who, lacking any sense of 
netiquette, made a general nuisance of themselves. This coincided with people start-
ing college, getting their first internet accounts, and plunging in without bothering 
to learn what was acceptable. These relatively small drafts of newbies could be 
assimilated within a few months. But in September 1993, AOL users became able to 
post to Usenet, nearly overwhelming the old-timers’ capacity to acculturate them; to 
those who nostalgically recall the period before, this triggered an inexorable decline 
in the quality of discussions on newsgroups. 
(On-line hacker Jargon File, version 4.4.7, 29 Dec, 2003)
As Eric S. Raymond writes in the Jargon File entry on the Eternal Sep-
tember, the entry of a new player to an established market can be the source 
of much upheaval. The effect that AOL had on the extant systems of the Net 
is well known. Whether World of Warcraft will continue to follow in AOL’s 
footsteps, as they did when entering the MMO market, remains to be seen. 
The long-term implications that this may hold for MMOs is also up for de-
bate. Just as nine years later, AOL is not the Internet, will the same be true of 
WoW for MMOs? 
Stream 2 (1) • op’tLand: Yet another September • 16
References
Abbate, J. (1999). Inventing the Internet. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Borgmann, A. (1984). Technology and the character of contemporary life: A 
philosophical inquiry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bryman, A. (2004). The Disneyization of society. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Chapman, M. R. (2006). In search of stupidity: Over 20 years of high-tech 
marketing disasters. 2nd ed. New York: Apress.
Ducheneaut, N., Yee, N., Nickell, E., & Moore, R.J. (2006). Building an 
MMO with mass appeal: A look at gameplay in World of Warcraft. 
Games and Culture 1(4) 281.
Feng, P., & Feenberg, A. (2008). Thinking about design: Critical theory of 
technology and the design process. In P. Vermaas, P. Kroes, A. Light, & 
S. Moore (Eds.), Philosophy and design: From engineering to architec-
ture. (pp. 105-118). New York: Springer. 
Kahney, L. (2002). Lifestyles of the Mac and famous. Wired. Retrieved July 
27, 2009 from http://www.wired.com/gadgets/mac/news/2002/07/53905
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
MMOGCHART.COM. (2008). [Charts showing MMOG Subscription 
Growth Version 23.0 April 9, 2008]. An Analysis of MMOG Subscrip-
tion Growth. Retrieved from http://www.mmogchart.com/charts/
Nelson, R., & Winter, S. (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 
Ritzer, G. (2000). The McDonaldization of society, New Century Ed. Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. 
Stauffer, D. (2000). It’s a wired wired world: Business the AOL way. Milford, 
CT: Capstone Publishing.
Swisher, K. (1998). AOL.com: How Steve Case beat Bill Gates, nailed the 
netheads, and made millions in the war for the Web. New York: Random 
House.
Swisher, K. (2003). There must be a pony in here somewhere: The AOL Time War-
ner debacle and the quest for a digital future. New York: Crown Business. 
Stream 2 (1) • op’tLand: Yet another September • 17
Wolf, M. J. P. (2008). The video game industry crash. In M. J. P. Wolf (Ed.), 
The video game explosion: A history from Pong to Playstation® and 
beyond (pp. 103-106). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
